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The Root Of All Evil?: The Image of the USA In Turkey Since 9/11
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This article talks about opposition to US politics, namely anti-Americanism, focusing on Turkey. In the first part, definition of Anti-Americanism is given, followed by a discussion about whether Anti-Americanism in Turkey is increasing or not. In the penultimate part, reasons for Anti-Americanism in Turkey are explored and the paper is concluded with the analysis of possible change in Anti-Americanism during Obama period.

Defining “Anti-Americanism”

Before talking about Anti-Americanism in Turkey, it is necessary, I believe, to present what Anti-Americanism means. Although the suffix “ism” is supposed to imply a systematic ideology or doctrine as in communism, capitalism, fascism etc., Anti-Americanism is not a proper ideology, but rather a stance including prejudice, distrust and often hatred against the USA; it denotes a certain antagonism against it. Barry Rubin points out that Anti-Americanism is as old as America itself, and he talks about two main themes as being “the vision of the United States as a bad society, which threatens to become the model for the whole world, and that of America as seeking global conquest.” [i]

One important subject should be mentioned as a pretext: Anti-Americanism undeniably includes antagonism towards American citizens as they are the ones electing the politicians who make decisions on foreign affairs. This antagonism is, however, not as severe as the antagonism against the policies of American governments. In a 2002 poll conducted in a number of Islamic countries, the average of favorable opinions toward U.S. foreign policy across six different policies was 19 percent compared to a 47 percent favorable rating of the American people. [ii]

In today’s world, Anti-Americanism is an omnipresent global phenomenon. [iii] It can be detected not only all around the world, but also in the USA itself. In some countries, it is especially severe with pro-violence motives against the USA, while in some other countries it
can only be seen passively within small fractions of society. Moreover, Anti-Americanism can sometimes be government-endorsed phenomena like in Iran and Venezuela. Hatred towards the USA is explicit in the impulsive rhetoric of the leaders of such countries. Perceptions of the USA internationally is also a crucial factor in order to understand the roots of Anti-Americanism. These perceptions can be paradoxical depending on the perceiver. For example as one expert says, to the secular Europeans, America is a religious country, whereas, to Muslims, America is an atheistic land. [iv]

However, I believe that it would be wrong to make a single definition of Anti-Americanism since there are multiple motives behind this opposition, shifting from one group to another. Therefore, I assert that there are different Anti-Americanisms. These different faces of Anti-Americanism includes different aspects of the antagonism. Some examples; professed disgust for the USA as a whole including citizens; distrust and dislike of American foreign policy; cultural racism which perceives the USA as culturally inferior or uncultured, etc. Even envy is also an important factor as Paul Johnson believes that “envy of American wealth, power, success and determination” plays a factor in nourishing Anti-Americanism. [v]

Is Anti-Americanism in Turkey Really Increasing?

There is certainly Anti-Americanism in Turkey and it has increased substantially after 9/11. Many polls conducted on Anti-Americanism show this fact clearly. For example, a poll conducted in 2006 in Turkey showed that 69% of Turkish people have a negative view of American influence in the world, 20% higher than the year before. [vi]

It is certain that favorability of US has been decreasing in Turkey. [vii] Although American favorability increased in 2004 by about 10 percent, it then continued to decrease. One poll conducted in 2007 emphasized that the most Anti-American nation is Turkey with only 9% of the surveyed population favoring the USA. [viii] Another study shows that in Turkey, where favorable views of the USA have declined markedly over the past seven years; opinions of Americans have fallen sharply as well. In 2002, this research indicates, positive
opinions of Americans declined 19 points in Turkey. A final study highlights that Turkey is the nation which most dislikes the American ideas of democracy and liberal capitalism.

**Reasons for Anti-Americanism in Turkey since 9/11**

Identities play a crucial role in contemporary Turkey. Turkish people define themselves through different identities as a result of which, a kind of identity inflation becomes apparent. Yet, it can be observed that there are roughly two main identity groups – apart from ethnic identities – (paving the way for a polarized society) in Turkey. Those who defines themselves as conservative Turks (which also include Islamists) and those who define themselves as secular Turks. The first group is usually affiliated with the ruling Justice and Development Party and the Nationalist Movement Party and the second group is generally affiliated with the Republican People’s Party, founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. (of course, this is a generalization; there is no clear line here) As a result of this division, there appears no single reason for opposing the politics of the USA. Of course, these two main groups have common rationales for opposing the USA. The Kurdish problem, for example, is one of these problems. After the US entered Iraq, the region became divided and an Iraqi Kurdistan region was established in the north of Iraq. Most Turkish people, considering this fact, believed that the USA created significant danger for Turkey by entering Iraq. Because, the Kurdistan region is believed to support separatist militant organization known as PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). For example, Egemen Bağış, former political advisor of the Prime Minister of Turkey and current minister for state and chief EU negotiator, said in 2006, ever since the Iraqi war started, “people on the street have started establishing a link between the U.S. and the PKK. I know that’s not true but it’s not important what I think. It’s important what the masses think.”

Anti-Imperialism is another common element affecting both groups including the Turkish socialists who form very small fractions. The fact that the USA is perceived as the most powerful imperialist country makes it feelings of antipathy inevitable. This kind of opposition has increased in Turkey since 9/11 as the USA intervened in regions which are close to Turkey, like Iraq and Afghanistan. In other words, both Turkish conservatives and
seculars felt the danger of imperialism, fostered by fierce militarism, much more acutely after 9/11.

Nationalism in Turkey is the binding principle of the last few decades as both secular and conservatives have firm nationalistic sentiments. These two main identity groups also possess distinct objections against US foreign policy. In the next section, I will clarify these different objections.

Islamists and Religious Nationalists

This group consists of what I referred to as conservative Turks. First of all, when Muslims, especially the radical ones are concerned, it is seen that there is a deep-rooted dislike against non-Muslims. This fact stems from both the Quran, holy book of Muslims, and historical experiences. In the Quran, it is emphasized that Muslims should not befriend non-Muslims. (5:51- Quran). Following this verse, a lot of Muslims have adopted critical and negative attitudes against non-Muslims, especially against Jews and Christians. Other than this, as previously stated, historical experiences continue to play an influential role. Especially, the crusades and the demise resulting from them have had a deep impact in the mindset of Muslims. This dislike against non-Muslims has unfortunately had an effect on Muslim Turks too. The radical members of this group, the Islamists, believe that Israel, and thus the Jewish people as a whole, is controlled by the USA politically and economically. Following on, both are major threats to Islam.

In Turkey, the National Outlook Movement, which is apparently the most outspoken Islamic movement, speaks openly against the USA in condemnation. This movement even bases its main policy on anti-American and anti-Semitic ideals. The National Outlook Movement introduced many political parties, all of which were closed down because of their radical religious activities. National Order Party, National Salvation Party, Welfare Party and Virtue Party were established and closed down successively. Today, the National Outlook Movement is being represented by the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) which got 5.1% of the votes with a substantial increase in the local elections in 2009. When party’s leader’s and prominent people’s discourses and rhetoric are analyzed, it is obvious that they oppose
United States of America which they believe desires the downfall of Turkey and Islam. The fact that the USA is the most powerful country globally with a predominantly Christian population is the main reason why Islamists in Turkey possess a relatively radical tone against it. Radical Islamists, who follow this National Outlook tradition in Turkey, developed anti-American sentiments inevitably. Votes that the Felicity Party acquired in the last election shows us that the number of people opposing the USA just because of their Muslim sentiments cannot be underestimated. This aspect of anti-Americanism is generally valid for the radical Muslims who feel themselves closer to the Islamic world with the dream of union of Islamic countries. It can be said that they have always carried anti-American attitudes; however, their tones and discourses have become much harsher since the 9/11 attacks as the USA’s response to it caused the deaths of a lot of Muslim people in the Middle East.

The other aspect, however, covers many more people. And it is mainly the result of US intrusion in the Middle East after the 9/11 attacks. I will refer this other group as religious nationalists (or conservatives). These people in Turkey generally vote for the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). They have strong Muslim sentiments as well as nationalistic sense. They can also easily be agitated against antagonism to Islam. After the 9/11 attacks, the USA declared a war on terrorism and began a military operation in Afghanistan in October 2001. The main aim was to capture Osama Bin Laden and destroy Al-Qaeda and related terrorist groups. As the war in Afghanistan was going on, the USA, with the help of some other western powers, began the invasion of Iraq within the context of war on terrorism. The so-called aim of the invasion was the USA’s claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, a threat to world security. However, during the invasion and after it, America and its allies caused the death of many innocent civilians. The entire discourse of the USA “has been framed by the doctrine of the war on terror that posits terrorism and security as the primary lens through which engagement with the Muslim world is viewed. The reaction to this from the Muslim world has been an intensely anti-Western discourse exacerbated by events such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Afghan War and the disastrous outcome of the invasion of Iraq.”[xiii] This created a resurgence of religious sentiments in the Muslim countries, which also affected Turkey.
In Turkey apart from humanist groups, religious nationalists were very much opposed to American presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some of them thought that this war was not on terrorism, but on Islam. Other events like the prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib, as well as significant civilian casualties in Fallujah during the Iraqi War increased “anti” feelings. In Muslim circles in Turkey, anti-Americanism has been nourished by any act against Islam coming from abroad.

**Secular Nationalists – Kemalists**

There is another large group of people in Turkey who oppose American policies due to rather different reasons. These are, as I will call them, secular nationalists or Kemalists. Frankel suggests that Anti-Americanism is reflected in the belief that a U.S. desire to control Iraqi oil was the United States’ principal reason for considering war. The sentiment, as the author argues, “quickly broadens to include a more general sense of alienation from American society, which is seen as gluttonous and greedy”[xiv] This is one aspect of the opposition against the USA in secular circles.

However, more importantly, the root of Anti-Americanism of the secular variety lies within the conspiracy theories about the USA. It is widely believed by the secular Turks that America has an aim of bringing moderate Islam to Turkey within the context of the so-called Greater Middle East Project. They see the intervention of the USA in Afghanistan and Iraq as indicative of this. It is believed that next step may be Iran, followed by Turkey. “Most ultra-secular pundits speculate about the alliance between moderate Islam and American imperialism – and they despise both”.[xv] That’s why the Anti-Americanism has been increasing also within this group in the post 9/11 conjuncture. I think that the belief in this conspiracy theory and conspiracy theories in general should be examined to understand the response of secular ones. One expert says that “People are also more likely to believe in conspiracy theories if they feel powerless in the face of large social authorities or institutions, and not part of the mainstream of society.”[xvi] Another view suggests that insecure and/or discontented people very often feel a need for a tangible enemy on which to externalize their anger.[xvii] Conspiracy theories may serve to provide an enemy to blame for problems which otherwise seem too abstract and impersonal. They provide ready
answers for the believers’ unanswered questions and help to resolve contradictions between known facts and an individual’s belief system.[xviii] The belief in conspiracy theories about the USA can result from this sense of powerlessness and the need to apportion blame. They direct their blame at the USA as it is the most powerful nation on earth economically and militarily in the present situation. This kind of belief can certainly be seen in other factions in the society, but it is predominantly widespread in secular clique.

When the AKP (Justice and Development Party) won a landslide victory in 2002 general election and came to power, secular people’s concerns heightened severely. Founding politicians of the AKP previously worked for the National Outlook Movement and have been seen as a danger to the secular structure of Turkey by the secular Kemalists who believed that the AKP may have been espoused by the CIA aiming to introduce moderate Islam. This perception can also be explained via belief in conspiracy theories as I have shown.

Another aspect of the opposition of seculars to the USA lies in their fundamental view of other countries. They believe that “Turks have no friends other than Turks” as reflected in a famous proverb. Therefore, they have strong distrust against other countries. Especially after the War on Terror, their distrust against the USA became stronger as they believe Turkey may be a future target. Several maps in certain American journals, in which southeast part of Turkey was shown as belonging to so-called “Kurdistan” nourished conspiracy theories about USA and added a lot to the antipathy.[xix][xx] This fear of Turkey’s being divided by foreign countries dates back to the end of Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Sevres, a peace treaty between Ottoman Empire and Allies at the end of World War I, proposed dividing Ottoman soils among the Allies. This treaty has never been enforced, but fear of Turkey’s division still continues even today due to many academics and media groups like “Cumhuriyet” which fosters that fear. This kind of thinking is called ‘Sevres paranoia’.

**The Future with Obama**

It is undeniable that the George W. Bush presidency has been the most disappointing period in history in terms of Anti-Americanism. It was also during his presidency that Turkey became the most Anti-American nation on earth.[xxi] A poll shows that just 2% express even
some confidence in Bush and 89% have little or no confidence. However, the election of Barack Hussein Obama has created huge enthusiasm all over the world with his promise of change and new direction in foreign policy. The background to the election of Obama should be carefully analyzed as his election has also its symbolic values. First of all, he is the first African-American president in the history of the United States of America. This is especially important considering the history of racism against African Americans in the USA. This is one aspect of the sympathy towards Obama, another is imminent in his Muslim middle name. Moreover, his father is known to be a Muslim, which is welcomed by many Muslim societies. He is also different from his former counterpart, George W. Bush, regarding their discourses. Obama has not been using the discourse of exclusion as in the “either you are with us or against us” doctrine of Bush, but rather he has adopted a conciliatory rhetoric. He also states that he has broken with the past and America is now changing with his leadership.

This world-wide “Obamania” has had its repercussions also in Turkey. Obama’s visit to Turkey was a pretty important one because he indicated the beginning of a new era in his speech there. Some of the critics and theorists have earlier argued that Obama designated the real end of Cold War with his speech. His visit to Turkey is considerable in another point since Turkey is the first predominantly Muslim country Obama has visited. Turkey is also the first overseas country Obama has intentionally visited if the summits of the G-20, NATO and EU are excluded. This shows the USA’s interest in renewing the relationship with Turkey; thus with the Muslim World.

The sympathy of Turkish people for the oppressed and the underdog is accepted as a trait of Turkish society. Obama’s situation which I mentioned above made him much more likable than his former counterparts. And, Barack Obama’s elaborate speech at the Turkish Parliament should mark the beginning of a new period in Turkish-American relations. In his speech, he continuously emphasized the importance of a friendly relationship between Turkey and America. He showed awareness of the increasing “anti” feelings against the USA and his speech aimed to fix this. Obama often gave reference to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. He talked about Turkey’s secular and strong democracy as the greatest legacy of Ataturk. He also praised the Independence War of Turkish people, which
was a felicitous point considering the nationalistic feelings of Turkish people. His speech would doubtless have pleased the religious nationalists and the secularists. His crucial points were about respect for Islam and finding a common ground for future relations. His keynote remark was that the USA will never be at war with Islam and that they “seek a broader engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect” by establishing a common ground; categorically dismissing the idea of the clash of civilizations. Another important point he made should be crucial in bringing relief to those who are worried about America’s approach to Islam; “The United States has been enriched by Muslim Americans. Many other Americans have Muslims in their families or have lived in a Muslim-majority country — I know, because I am one of them.” These words certainly gave rise to sympathy for Obama.

Obama’s speech has been met with a widely positive reception in Turkey both by the seculars and conservatives. However, what will happen with anti-Americanism in Turkey during and after Obama’s presidency remains to be seen.

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Candidate Selection and Balloting in the European Parliament: Barriers to the Development of European Party Groups

Regina Topolinskaya

The European Parliament presents an intriguing case study for the scholarly debate of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. As the only democratically elected institution of the European Union, scholars conceptualize the EP as a legitimizing body for EU governance. The trend of its increasing power throughout its existence is utilized by neofunctionalists to advance the merits of their conceptual framework. Yet a closer look at the power of member-states in the EP, represented by the various national parties, challenges this view and highlights the intergovernmental nature of the EP. While increasingly institutionalized within the parliament, EP party groups still face obstacles to development that stunt their growth into European-wide parties, especially in running European platforms and maintaining party cohesion. Without removal of the powers of national parties to select candidates for EP elections and place their label, rather than the EP party one, on ballots, EP parties will continue to face these obstacles and exist as parties without a European mandate, unable to contribute to a true democratic legitimacy in Europe.

As it currently stands European elections are conducted under 27 different electoral systems. Elections in member-states differ by list (closed versus open) type, how the vote is calculated, and how citizens vote based on geographic designation. In the 2004 election, 18
members chose to conduct voting by one national district, 5 by regional districts, and 2 others by a more nuanced system (Judge & Earnshaw, 2008, p. 73). Despite the differences, what remains standardized is candidate selection by national parties, as well as ballots featuring national party names, rather than those of their EP group. The European Union has continued to allow national parties to monopolize these two areas, resulting in obstacles for EP party groups in elections and during voting within the EP. It is to the former effect of candidate selection and party labels on elections that I now turn.

The EP elections that occur every five years have been characterized by various political scientists as “second order.” While national elections for parliament are perceived as first order in priority and importance for Europeans, EP elections have been relegated to second tier phenomena. The characterization stems from the platforms of parties and issues covered in EP elections. Oftentimes national parties dominate the flow of election dialogue, leading to platforms and debates that can be characterized as overly national and failing to address the European issues these elections were designed to cover. Examples of elections where European issues were present are not non-existent, especially as the EU delves into more sensitive areas of public policy making, but their inclusion takes a secondary position to national issues brought up by the parties. This convergence in issues addressed between national parliamentary elections and EP elections leads to the second order status of the latter.

The reliance on national, rather than supranational, issues for EP elections has been borne out by the scholarly body of research conducted on this topic. Ferrara and Weishaupt (2004) find support for this by analyzing the effect of national parties in EP elections based on their standing during national elections. They discover that small parties and opposition
parties do consistently better in EP elections than national elections, which they attribute to voters’ desire to punish large parties for their performance in parliament and/or government. Additionally, the timing of the EP election relative to national elections for parliament vastly influences the results. The loss incurred by government parties increases as EP elections are held from the beginning of their time in office to the middle of their tenure, implying that as time goes on and government parties’ popularity wanes, they will be punished by voters at the European polls. EP elections arguably take on the character of midterm elections in the U.S. where voters send signals to the ruling party in the executive by punishing or rewarding the legislative branch. The difference here is that cues are transmitted between two legislative branches in the unique national-supranational relationship of the EU.

By rewarding anti-system parties, EP elections introduce a shock to the EP political system, forcing realignments upon the EP balance of party groups. While functioning of the system is smooth throughout the five-year legislative period, elections can be particularly disruptive. According to Luciano Bardi (1996, p. 111), “Such realignments are facilitated by the second-order nature of EP elections, which make them more volatile than national elections. In particular, protest voting behavior can be very fickle and reward different anti-system parties in different elections, sometimes changing substantially the composition of national delegations from one election to the next (such as the unexpected success and subsequent demise of the French Greens in 1989 and 1994)”. The reliance of EP elections on national party performance in national parliaments facilitates this second order nature of EP elections, preventing them from taking on a European character and eroding the stability of the European Parliament.
The monopoly of national over supranational issues in EP elections is caused in part by the domination of national parties over EP party groups on MEP’s during elections. They select candidates to run under their label and are able to formulate the platforms MEP’s run on, influencing the shape of the issues debated. What results is a paradox of EU elections dependent on national-level issues that may or may not be significant for EP legislative priorities. Without any tangible incentives to offer MEP candidates during the elections (outside of regular legislative sessions), EP party groups simply do not possess the tools to influence the flow of the issue agenda of elections. National parties wield the tool of candidate selection and can ensure that candidates will run on the platforms they deem fit, likely national ones that will help their party in EP and future national elections.

Additionally, since the national party label is displayed on EP ballots, voters cast their votes based on associations they have with that party. Lacking an EP party group present for candidates to be identified with, voters do not need to educate themselves about the party groups or their issues, a conflict that stretches beyond elections that I will explore later in the context of EP legitimacy. These two factors, candidate selection and parties on ballots, heavily affect the second order nature characterization of EP elections.

The second effect of national party control can be observed in the legislative arena between elections. MEP’s must balance a distinct grouping of incentives unique to the European Parliament, those accrued from their European party group and others flowing from their national party. This dual incentive structure is arguably present in this developed form in no other parliament in the world. Due to the structure of the EP’s rules and regulations, party groups are placed in a position where they are able to effectively distribute key committee assignments (based on their size and position) and organizational
funds. The advantages of attaching oneself to an EP party group is clear, which may account for the steady decrease in non-aligned members since the first EP election in 1979 when non-attached MEP’s comprised 33.3 percent of the EP (Bardi, 1996, p. 109). The figure stands at approximately 4 percent today.

National delegations are also present within the EP to monitor votes and possibly put pressure on dissenting MEP’s. National parties utilize one central incentive for compliance, candidate selection, in addition to other peripheral ones such as future assignments within the home party. These are tools that national parties are accustomed to using in their home parliaments with more or less efficacious results. From an intuitive standpoint, taking into account the desires of MEP’s, national-level pressure, rather than EU party group insistence, would maintain an advantage when the two groups face a dichotomy in interests.

MEP’s, like most national legislators, possess the following three interests: reelection, holding office (such as chairmanships and presidencies), and promoting certain policies in the public arena (Hix, 2004). The accomplishment of the first goal is determined by national parties who select candidates and essentially help run their campaigns, the latter being an action that transnational party groups have not devoted significant priority, and subsequently funding, to be included in. An MEP’s prospects for election are directly tied to their national party affiliation.

The other two goals relate to EP party group membership. The party group is responsible for determining who receives higher offices within the party and the parliamentary committees and plays a key role in securing the vote on the majority of policy issues. Yet to get to the second and third goals, MEP’s must secure the first. Office and policy
concerns are futile without reelection. Because national parties maintain dominance over reelection, their preferences should triumph over those of EP party groups.

Empirically the dominance of national party preferences is corroborated. Simon Hix (2002b) finds that, although party groups can be generally classified as cohesive, when defection occurs, it is likely due to the preferences of the national party, not the legislator’s own personal policy predilections. By placing each party group, national party, and MEP on a pro-anti EU and left-right dimension, Hix is able to calculate the differences between MEP and EU group preferences, as well as differences of national party and EU group preferences on both dimensions. He discovers that the latter is more significant in predicting defection. For example, MEP’s associated with the British Conservative Party were very likely to defect from the EPP-ED’s position in 2004 even if their own personal placing on the two dimensions was closer to the EPP-ED than to that of the British Conservatives. The power of national parties in this situation is evident.

Further support comes from Thorsten Faas (2003). Similarly finding high party cohesion in the EP, he analyzes under what circumstances defection is likely to occur from the EP party group. According to Faas (2003, p. 850), “in short, the group cohesion picture that has emerged so far is characterized by a very high degree of cohesion, but it seems as if this is a rather fragile equilibrium that can easily be disturbed as soon as national parties interfere.” Faas finds that defection increases as the centralization of the national party’s candidate selection mechanism, the frequency with which the party monitors its MEP’s, and party-centered quality of an MEP’s country’s electoral system increase, defection becomes more probable. Faas’s results support the idea that national variables lead to defection and
that candidate selection does play an integral part in an MEP’s decision on whether to defect or not.

Despite the discussion of defection, it is important to note that cohesion is high in the EP. Based on 1999 through 2002 roll call votes the cohesion of the three main groups at the time (EPP, PES, ELDR) averaged 89 percent, an incredibly impressive level. The cohesiveness is also continuous from the first parliament, where cohesion reached 84 percent (Hix, 2002a, p. 53). Cohesion scores, whatever their merits, can be deceiving though. Since roll call votes are only called on approximately one-third of all votes in the EP (the other portion tabulated by a show of hands or electronic voting), it is plausible that they represent a skewed sample of legislative votes. In practice, roll call votes are ordered to embarrass another party, show an EP group’s position on an issue, or keep track of votes for a party (Hix, 2002b, p. 693). Whatever their shortcomings they remain the best, and solitary, data source for analysis. Even with a possible tendency of roll call data to exaggerate the extent of cohesiveness in the EP, it is undeniably strong and can not be discounted.

When defections do occur though, their cause oftentimes lies with a national party’s diverging preferences from an EP group. The possibility remains that the votes that defection occurs on are on the more sensitive of issues, something that has not yet been addressed in the literature due to the limitations of roll call votes. The recorded small percentage of defection then should not draw attention away from the national party’s pull on many MEP’s. Many MEP’s keep in constant contact with their respective national parties, exerting significant influence on members. In a recent survey, 30.5 percent of national parties reported regularly monthly meeting with their members, while 25.4 percent had no regular meetings, 23.7 organized one to four times a year, and 16.9 had weekly meetings.
Although the numbers are not striking, the level of regular communication is high and shows the involvement of national parties in the legislative behavior of MEP’s. Voting instructions by national parties were low with approximately half (47.5 percent of parties surveyed) reporting they never gave voting commands. 8.5 percent did so regularly, while 32.2 percent engaged in this behavior strictly for issues of high importance. On a scale of one to five, parties ranked their control of members in the EP at 2.3 (Raunio, 2000).

Raunio interprets these statistics as a lack of scrutiny on the part of national parties, yet an alternate explanation is present when analyzing the possible bias of the data. Excluding the data on party meetings, the validity of responses on voting instructions and control of MEP’s (on a one to five scale) is uncertain. National parties are likely to be reticent in admitting that they command their members to vote a certain way for fear of being perceived as stifling freedom of choice and intruding upon EU group votes. It is also unlikely that they would mark down a high score for control of their MEP’s. These stigmas skew the data, making a conclusion impossible. Despite this, the data on regular meetings does evince the consistent communication between MEP’s and their national parties, a link which is maintained in part by the party’s monopoly over candidate selection. Without this tool, communication would undoubtedly be lower and influence defection from EP party group positions to a lesser extent. Raunio (2002, p. 14) asserts that “the procedure for candidate selection ensures that most MEP’s will remain loyal to their national parties.”

Given the national party influence on MEP’s by control over the party on the ballot and candidate selection, where does that leave the EP in its progression towards institutionalization? Institutionalization has grown over the years. As noted previously, the number of non-attached members has declined, making membership in a party group a near
requirement for MEP’s wishing to significantly impact public policy and move up the ranks of the EP ladder. Participation rates by members has also increased from 45 percent in the first directly elected parliament to 73 percent in the fifth, yielding rates comparable to national parliaments and the American Congress (Hix, 2002b). The data points to the embedding of party groups in the EP system and professionalization of the institution overall. These indicators are positive signs and will likely increase as the amount of legislation that passes through the EP increases and issues tackled become more controversial, which is probable considering the trends in EU policy movements.

As this occurs though, what will be the position of the national parties? Their presence represents a serious obstacle to the institutionalization of European party groups. As already mentioned, national parties play a strong role in influencing defections from party group positions and in molding the agenda for EP elections, begging the question of whether European party groups can be characterized as true parties. This is a crucial question not just for the longevity of the party groups themselves but also one for the existence of the EU. With strong connections to their MEP’s by candidate selection, the status of national parties as a rival influence on MEP’s lessens the chances of EP party group institutionalization. Groups simply will not be able to receive the sort of cohesion they require without controlling candidate selection. As Shattschneider famously put it: “He who controls the nomination owns the party” (Hix, 2004, p. 199).

The implications for EU democratic governance are steep. Challengers of the democratic deficit point to the EP as a directly elected institution, in addition to the indirect election of the Council of Ministers and European Council. Essentially, the EP is the Atlas of the EU, holding the viability of the counterattacks to the democratic deficit concept on its
shoulders. Without representative parties, democracies lose their legitimacy, and the EU is no different in this respect. For the EU to seriously counter any claims of democratic deficit, the union needs institutionalized parties that possess legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. The sort of legitimacy that MEP’s engender in elections is nation-wide, yielding a national mandate to pursue positions of importance for member-states. A true democratic parliament would contain a mandate for the sort of policies most important to its purpose, an EU-wide mandate. This was the purpose of direct elections, according to former President of the Commission Walter Hallstein, to “encourage the emergence of truly European parties” (Judge & Earnshaw, 2008, p. 81).

“Truly European parties” have not materialized, even with direct elections. In the EP arena, national parties have the ability to control key votes because of their monopolization of candidate selection. In the whole of the EU, citizens know much less about party groups than their national parties and treat EP elections as second order. Transnational parties have not been willing, or able, to extend their reach to the very citizens they represent. This stems from the control of platform by national parties, related to candidate selection by the national parties.

Similarly, as ballots feature national party labels, EU citizens are deprived of the opportunity and incentives to familiarize themselves with supranational party groups, greatly eroding their role as democratic machines of legitimization for the EU.

Essentially the choice for EP party groups is whether they will function as simply an aggregation of national party interests or become true European parties, as many European federalists intended. This depends largely on removing the national parties’ control of elections, integral to controlling MEP votes and the emphasis of campaigns. Reform of the
status quo will not be an easy task, especially given the likely opposition most member-
states will naturally exhibit under pressure from their domestic parties. The political will for
reform has not been present throughout the course of EP history. Nonetheless the
significance of EP parties has not escaped the framers of EU constitutional law.

According to Article 191 of the Maastricht Treaty, “Political parties at European level
are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a
European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.”
European political parties have the potential to fulfill these functions. With the proper
reform, advancing away from national party-centered rules, European party groups can
become truly representative of citizens and move closer toward democratically expressing
their preferences on the Europe of the future.

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The Major Struggles Faced by Women in Refugee and IDP Camps

Jacqueline Ros

Emerging post World War II, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, or UNHCR, was founded in 1950 as a three year mandate to help the European Community manage the prodigious task of assisting refugees repatriate to their home country or find asylum in a new country. In 2003, as the number of refugees seeking assistance internationally rose, the United Nations General Assembly extended the mandate for the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees "until the refugee problem is solved" or in other words indefinitely (website: The History of UNHCR). Currently, UNHCR has extended their support to include not only refugees but IDPs or Internally Displaced Persons and stateless persons as well. The number of people fleeing their country has increased since 2003 for reasons varying from violent ethnic-conflits to resource-bankrupting pollution. In fact, in 2007, 25 million people alone were made refugees by contaminated rivers (Brenman 2009). UNHCR’s 2008 statistical evidence documents how many people were found by United Nations Refugee Agency to be considered part of the “total population of concern” to number 34,415,751 people and that people classified as “refugees or people in refugee-like situations” numbered 10,478,621 from which aggregate 4,598,433 people were assisted by UNHCR (website: Total Population of concern to UNHCR 2009). However, these numbers fail to properly actualize the suffering behind the statistics. As Joseph Stalin infamously stated, “the death of one man is a tragedy, the death of millions is a statistic”. This paper seeks to substantiate the suffering behind the statistics and more gender-specifically answer the question- what are the three major problems facing women in refugee and IDP camps?
Empirical evidence identifies continuous gender-based violence or GBV and a lack of overall health service options, as direct causes of suffering for women in these camps, and suppressive cultural norms as indirect barriers to their overall social progress, as the most pressing issues restricting the betterment of the lives of refugee and IDP women. This paper will provide informative accounts of each of the three issues aforementioned and more specifically, regarding health services, this paper will focus on maternal health and female genital mutilation, or FGM, in refugee and IDP camps. Following, based on the information expanded upon in this essay, a brief analysis as to what are potential calls of action for UNHCR and related organizations to consider will be discussed. Note that due to the nature of these three issues, there will be some overlap.

Historically, women are the most subjugated minority within any group, and the violence they face when fleeing armed conflicts can have a perverse sexual component. Particularly since, these conflict-inflicted areas are known to utilize violence against women as a weapon of war. This form of violence is known as GBV, which not only entails undo violence on women during conflicts but any violence towards a person due to their gender or perceived status as a sexual object which includes domestic violence or IPV, forced prostitution/slavery, FGM or female genital mutilation, sexual favors traded for food or assistance and rape. And in communities where gender roles are narrow and the belief in a man’s sexual entitlement is dominant, violence against women is depressingly normal (Olsen and Scharffscher 377, 2004). Refugee and IDP camps are such communities. Research suggests that GBV is not solely caused by mal-intent or corruption but by failures within the camps organizations that leave women more susceptible to violence. Organizational failures, such as lack of communication between the organizations assisting refugees and poor structural layouts of the camp, increase the prevalence of rape (Olsen and Scharffscher 384,
An example of this type of failure occurred in the West African refugee camps where approximately 67 aid workers were accused of abusing their power over camp resources and forcing some women and girls to exchange sex or sexual favors for “a handful of fruit or a bar of soap” as family members turned a blind eye for the sake of survival (Chonghaile 1, 2002). Attacks on the camp sites or surrounding areas occur predominately while women wait to pump water, collect firewood, or on their way to the latrines at night. A solution is needed to provide accessible alternative sources of fuel collection and safer latrine areas to these women (Olsen and Scharffscher 384, 2004).

Apart from the dangers within the camps, much of the violence perpetrated against refugee and IDP women comes from men in the host countries. In the Blue Waters camp in Cape Town, South Africa, xenophobic violence led to a violent attack on Cleophas Sewika’s family, “the men went door-to-door looking for us shouting, it was frightening. In the violence, he says, his wife had acid poured on her head and he was beaten…since then his 12-year-old daughter, Sera, has been raped” (Evans 1, 2009). These violent outbursts against displaced peoples stem from various sources, from locals fearing loss of jobs, which is the case in the Blue Waters camp area, to locals realizing that some refugees have better access to health services than themselves, which is the case with camps in rural Uganda (Wynd and Durrheim 563, 2004).

So not only do women face dangers in the camps and around the camps, but many displaced women arrive at the camps having already survived vicious attacks in their own villages. A female refugee interviewed by Amnesty International affirmed that in Darfur, Sudan the Janjawid militia came to their village and raped the 15 women and girls who had not escaped in time, breaking their limbs to prevent them from escaping (Reducing Violence...
Health care providers in the camps need to be able to recognize signs of trauma and help them to deal with the emotional and physical aftermath that follows the victims of violence with the assistance of a counselor.

Ultimately, many of the emotionally-crippling offenses committed against women come from within their own families in the form of IPV. The women attribute the men’s feelings of hopelessness and inability to provide for their families within the camps as reasons for increased beatings and marital rape. Accordingly, in an IDP camp in South Darfur, Sudan, surveys found that 51% of women believe that a wife must consent to sexual intercourse regardless of her willingness to participate (Kim, Torbay and Lawry 356, 2007). One Congolese woman described her beatings as easier to forgive previously because her spouse would give her presents post the assault, usually in the form of a kitenge, a nice dress typical to the area; save presently, “he cannot give what he does not have” (Pavlish 31, 2007). Few women come forward in these cases, considering IPV a personal matter, not one that should involve external interference (Khawaja, Linos and El-Roueiheb 211, 2008). Most women cannot even garner emotional support from their fellow females. Research in an IDP camp in South Darfur, Sudan found that 43% of women they interviewed agreed that a husband may beat a disobedient wife. These attitudes reflected in the interviews may have serious health consequences for women (Kim, Torbay and Lawry 359, 2007). Violence comes in many forms and from various angles in refugee and IDP camps, but the next form which will be addressed, female genital mutilation, is one whose effects are not always considered negative by the females in the communities because they are seen as part of their heritage.

Cultures are dynamic; history has proven time and again that when people want change they will fight to have it. But when faced with adversity, people will resist change to
hold on to their traditions. In Eastern Sudan, the word ‘sunna’, one of the forms of female genital mutilation, refers to the Arabic word for tradition (Furuta and Mori 892, 2008). FGM is primarily practiced in the Western, Eastern and North-Eastern regions of Africa, in several countries within the Middle East and Asia, as well as in certain immigrant communities in Europe and North America (website: Female Genital Mutilation 2010). In Sierra Leone, 80 to 90 percent of women have undergone FGM (Olsen and Scharffsher 380, 2004) and in South Darfur, Sudan, studies found that within the IDP camp 84% of women reported a history of FGM, but their findings did not include girls below the age of 15 so the numbers could be higher (Kim, Torbay and Lawry 356, 2007). There are four levels of female genital mutilation (website: Female Genital Mutilation 2010). The term ‘sunna’ found in Eastern Sudan refers to the first level of FGM which amongst many communities is seen as a safe option especially when compared to ‘pharaohni’, the equivalent to the fourth level of FGM, and is seen by community members as an excellent alternative. Refusing the procedure is not considered an option because in these communities FGM is deemed necessary. Woman who have not been circumcised are seen as unsuitable for marriage (Furuta and Mori 892, 2008). Many humanitarian organizations have instructed health professionals in the camps to attempt to dissuade women from undergoing these procedures and to refuse to perform the procedure. Organizations, such as the World Health Organization, have opted instead to promote empowerment for women. A necessary cause, but one that only addresses long-term goals and not the short-term crisis women in these camps are currently experiencing.

In conjunction with all the negative consequences that violence brings to the life of a female refugee or IDP, women in these camps face additional health struggles which directly impacts their physical well-being: the overburden of daily work and ambivalence towards reproductive decisions. A frequent theme brought to light when interviewing displaced
women on whether they would want family planning, or FP, so that they could effectively space between children was the need for approval. “I have never discussed FP with my husband because I know he does not want spacing. I don’t do anything that my husband doesn’t want”, stated one woman in a refugee camp in Eastern Sudan (Furuta and Mori 895, 2008). Apart from educating these families on family planning in a way that they may approve, the pregnant women themselves need to be made knowledgeable on how to recognize signs of complications in a pregnancy and to move past prejudices that births are not ‘natural’ if they are assisted in a health clinic versus being assisted at home. Most displaced women prefer assistance from a village midwife, believing them to have more modern training. A majority of women feel comfortable with a midwife, a belief that is shared among husbands and mothers-in-law, the primary decision makers regarding pregnancy care in households (Furuta and Mori 897, 2008). In the IDP camp in South Darfur, Sudan, 67% of women interviewed reported that they needed permission from a family member to access health care most or all of the time (Kim, Torbay and Lawry 356, 2007). Since cultural beliefs on health cannot be changed overnight, we can use the information from on-site research to better understand ways in which we can work within the cultures to improve the health of refugee and IDP women. Evidence directs us to a simple conclusion: in order to more broadly increase female health in the camps, an increase in the amount of trained midwives found in the camps is necessary.

Alice Walker, an American activist on race and gender, once said that “the most common way people give up their power is by thinking they do not have any”. But until there is a social progression in these communities from within, in which women chose to express their voices and fight for their rights, nothing will change. Steps need to be taken to not only educate women on their options, but to educate men on how increased freedoms
for women can be advantageous for them as well. Men in these camps complain that they feel bored and useless, they explain that they have “hands and force” but no jobs (Pavlish 32, 2007). The cultural barrier that must be overcome in this circumstance is what men view as jobs that are acceptable or masculine. In that same refugee camp where men expressed their feelings of uselessness, women described the stress and physical toll overwork takes on them: “In general, all duties go to the women- cooking, food, carrying dry wood, going to the market, going to the UNHCR to get food... she’s the one. In general, men sit at home and not do things... most just wake up and sit.” (Pavlish 31, 2007). Despite facing inconceivable odds, displaced women continuously find the will not only to survive with minimal assistance, but to assure the survival of their dependents. Their ability, and their burden, to promote the health of the entire community is why it is crucial to assist displaced women live safer and healthier lives.

Having demonstrated convincingly the devastation caused by gender-based violence and a lack of health service options for women in refugee and IDP camps and how repressive cultural norms make it difficult to find solutions, this paper will bring to light possibilities which may not have been previously addressed. These solutions seek to creatively approach and work with the cultural barriers blocking the eradication of GBV and lacking health service options. Possible resolutions regarding domestic violence and FGM will be jointly proposed. First, as mentioned previously, these camps are lacking a sufficient amount of midwives to deal with the large populations, whom for cultural reasons, prefer to turn to them than to healthcare professionals in clinics (Furuta and Mori 898, 2008). Since it is difficult to find health professionals to volunteer in these camps, perhaps an apprenticeship program could be implemented in camps, in which midwives take on young girls as their apprentices. This would not only quickly increase the number of women available to help
pregnant women or sick women, but in many cases this could help to give girls, perhaps even more specifically, orphan girls, a chance for an increased education, as well as, an opportunity to gain an increased status within the camps. Also needed are programs or seminars that work to educate the men in the advantages in allotting their wives greater freedoms concerning their own health, such as her ability to work more efficiently when in good health and her ability to care for children more effectively as well.

To decrease the burden of chores refugee and IDP women face, such as collecting firewood and drinking water, these chores could be marketed to the men in these camps as the job of strong men. Not only would men be given a sense of purpose but the women would be relieved from the extra work. They would also be able to avoid two of the three places in a camp in which women are most susceptible to attack, as mentioned previously, the other being walking to the latrines at night. Thus, not only could this marketing scheme eliminate a health concern, but also eliminate an organizational failure concern to protect these women in susceptible areas.

Apart from solutions that have already been discussed regarding certain organizational failures that endanger women, a problem that could be neutralized is that of exploitation by the distributors of resources. Simple solutions suggest having female aid workers distributing the resources themselves (Protection for Women 2002). But females willing to work in these circumstances are few. If there are not enough women to distribute the resources themselves, perhaps just one female overseer to assure the safety of women could be more possible and to assure that women and children get sufficient resources, have it be protocol that women and children get priority in lines so as to decrease their dependency on men in the camps for supplies.
To decrease xenophobic violence against refugees, as was the case in South Africa, organizations and governments could work jointly to utilize social media that appeals to the better natures of people and the need for communities to open their arms to those who have already suffered so much. In Pakistan, as many as two million refugees have been welcomed into nearby villages. The village leaders say that they are funded by donations and supported by the Pashtun code of honor and hospitality (Khan 3, 2009). Inspiring this generosity prior to the arrival of the refugees could lessen the backlash against them.

For the women who have faced violence prior to their arrival at the camps, perhaps a community outreach program could be created. This program could recruit women who are already situated as female leaders within the camps. By locating the female leaders in a camp and utilizing them as a resource for counseling, you quickly help new female refugees feel a sense of community. Programs such as these could possibly even transform past just a stable sense of community and grow into a program that gives these women a sense of empowerment.

Through its various manifestations, “violence is the result of the complex interplay of individual, relationship, social, cultural and environmental factors” (website: World Report 12, 2002). Yet, the issues that are most difficult to confront are that of domestic violence and female genital mutilation. Reason being, the abuses laid upon women in these circumstances are not caused by strangers but by the very people who should be working towards their increased safety and improved health. As mentioned previously, domestic violence is not even seen as an issue that needs to be addressed publicly and women many times feel that the abuse is deserved. But for the purposes of this argument we will use FGM as the primary example. In a refugee camp in Eastern Sudan, a woman
described what occurred despite warnings given by health professionals, “We asked the midwife to perform sunna on my daughter, but she refused...She said that ‘sunna’ is not good for health. So, my mother-in-law did it. She had never done it before...she knows how from her experience” (Furuta and Mori 891-892, 2008). Although it seems immoral for many in Western cultures to provide these women with FGM, the process of changing a society’s mindset is a slow one. And instead of seeing the providing of ‘sunna’ as a negative option, one could see it as a small step to phasing out the more severe forms of FGM. Also, by providing ‘sunna’ in a professional environment, while still educating people on the negative consequences of FGM, we could at minimum provide for these women a safer option, improving their lives and health in the short-run while still working towards future social change in the long-run. Otherwise, they may be forced to face the health consequences of female genital mutilation performed incorrectly which includes hemorrhage, infection, urologic and sexual dysfunction, difficulties with childbirth, and psychological complications (Kim, Torbay and Lawry 359). A testament to how people can change their view on cultural norms once given the right incentive appears in the study from a refugee camp in Eastern Sudan. They found that many of the women who have resettled in Western countries or who have wanted to resettle in Western countries where FGM is unusual, maybe even illegal, have shown to completely abandon this violent cultural practice resulting for their desire to assimilate and be accepted into their new communities (Furuta and Mori 893). If given proper incentives, unnecessary acts of violence based on culture can be eliminated.

To conclude on the idea of proper incentives, the need for stronger consequences for members of the camp who commit acts of violence needs to be considered. Since funding for the aid is given primarily by Western countries, the people in the camps need to be made aware of the laws supported by the donor countries, such as the United Nations Declaration
on Human Rights. An example of a consequence that could possibly lower the amounts of rapes in the camps is that anyone accused and found guilty of rape by the aid staff in the camps be no longer supported by aid workers and turned out from the camp grounds. In particular UN aid workers should fight to promote Human Rights in these camps and provide incentives for those who chose to not respect the rights of others. The evidence given supports the concept of a more assertive approach, since current methods of dealing with issues of violence clearly are ineffective. Hopefully, creativity combined with assertiveness, could bring to these women a place of true refuge, free from the struggles they now currently face.

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Bibliography


Fair Trade at Work: The Effects of Fair Trade on the Economic Development of Agricultural Producers in Latin American Countries

Ross Mittiga

Fair Trade (FT) is a social movement that exists through trading partnerships between Global North (hereafter advanced industrialized countries, abbreviated AICs) and Global South countries (hereafter lesser-developed countries, abbreviated LDCs), which is facilitated through affiliate organizations – chiefly, the Fair Trade Federation (FTF), the European Fair Trade Association (EFTA), the International Fair Trade Association (IFTA) and the Fair Trade Labelling Organizations International (FLO)(“Fair Trade Federation”, 4). These organizations promote values in advocacy of: sustainable development in agriculture, leveling of global trade inequities, and higher (or “fair”) wages and safer working conditions for producers, and the development of producer organizations to redistribute FT benefit initiatives, all primarily within LDCs (Hira and Ferrie, 107). The FT movement uses targeted labeling, producer and consumer education, ethical member requirements, “fair price” floors, and public transparency to accomplish these objectives. This broad, market-based model is proving increasingly effective in North American and European markets (Bezencon and Blili, 2009)(Raynolds, 2)(“Fair Trade Federation”, 6-11). The rapid economic growth of FT products in the last decade is at least partially related to the upward-trending demand of increasingly socially-conscious consumer’s in AICs (Raynolds, 2)(Hira and Ferrie, 107).
Despite the ethical platform FT organizations advocate, there is debate over whether FT is affecting development in positive and meaningful ways in participant LDCs (Davies and Fridell, 83-86). This paper will examine the effects of FT on the general, or trending, economic development of producers in Latin America, specifically in the agricultural sector where FT is most predominantly focused. Through techniques that promote the stabilization of commodity prices, improve the conditions and wages of LDC producers and laborers, and, at least in limited extent, address the significant terms of trade disparities among AICs and LDCs in agricultural trade, economic development is being positively affected. These economic methods, in addition to the formation of cooperative producer organizations, is translating, in some degree, to social welfare benefits for producers (Ronchi, 24) (Calo and Wise, 12) (Imhoff and Lee, 18-20). However, both the impact of these organizations and the effects of elevated income are often difficult to discern, and may come at the cost of development in other sectors, to some extent offsetting the positive gains they offer Latin American countries (Utting-Chamorro, 596-7) (Yanchus and Vanssay, 236).

**Data and Evidence Reflecting Economic Impact**

Positive economic development is pursued in the form of “fair price” floors and the implementation and utilization of producer organizations. These two components of FT organizations are meant to provide for short and long-term development of member-producers by improving the basic livelihoods of the producers, while enhancing their capacities to better ensure sustainable economic growth (UC, 597) (Imhof and Lee, 2-3) (“EFTA”, 2006).
The most discussed and identifiable component of FT policy, especially among AIC consumers, is the price floor for commodity purchases, or the “fair price” policy (Ronchi, 1). The willingness to pay this elevated “fair price” has developed as a result of increasing demand within the “niche” market of socially-conscious consumers in the Global North. FT ethical objectives align with AIC consumer preferences there, satisfying their demand for products that contribute to social fairness and sustainable development, while simultaneously existing within current global trade models and along the AIC predilection for market-based solutions (Calo and Wise, 12)(Raynolds, 10)(UC, 585)(Fridell, 2006).

The effect of paying higher, “fair prices” translates into several tangible benefits for producers in LDCs. The most observable difference is perhaps the increased income rates for producers (UC, 591). The higher income affords a range of previously unrealizable opportunities on the individual level. Among these are capital improvement capabilities, which include the ability to reinvest in better farm machinery and production inputs (like fertilizer and better equipment), the ability to improve the condition of producer’s homes, and the power to hire help to boost productivity and output (which, in turn, leads to higher job creation) (UC, 589, 591) (Raynolds, 19). Producers who have received increased income also report better access to health care and improved nutrition, which, again, correlates to increased productivity rates (UC, 596). In addition, partially through income increases, producers have had more and sustained access to educational opportunities, both for themselves and their families, including the ability to more adequately provide school supplies for their children (UC, 596) (Imhof and Lee, 5). All of these opportunities are linked
to the alleviation of poverty in rural Latin American areas, which is particularly severe among indigenous farmers and landless workers (UC, 596) (Imhof and Lee, 5, 18-19) (Raynolds, 22) (Ronchi, 2). Of course, it is important to note that though FT can be observed to raise the income of producers, that income raise cannot be determinably linked to better livelihoods for recipients of the higher wages (Ronchi, 2). It is often impossible to separate the effects of income gain from FT from other factors which could affect development.

The benefits of increased income appear to correlate to broader development gains as well. Many farmers report entering the FT market because of the stability of the prices generated by the price floor, which has helped them not only to avoid the “poverty traps” that plague agricultural commodity sectors, but to find security in their production allowing for more sustained development (Calo and Wise, 12) (UC, 589-91, 596) (Raynolds, 18, 22). This sustained development, in conjunction with more stable individual incomes, has led to rapid economic growth and larger returns to productivity. This growth is, in turn, providing for the diffusion of generated capital gains, which appear to be making differences in overall economic development of rural communities within Latin American countries (UC, 591, 596) (Raynolds, 19) (Calo and Wise, 12, 16). This is evident in the increased income of landless workers and non-FT farmers. The former benefits as FT producers have increased abilities to hire landless laborers (via higher personal income) and the impetus to offer them living wages (per FT policy), consequently providing landless laborers the opportunity to obtain basic nutrition, health care and access to education (UC, 596). Non-FT farmers benefit more indirectly. FT producers are able, through producer organizations, to avoid
intermediary production (or “middle-men”). This drops supply to these intermediary traders, forcing them to offer higher rates to non-FT growers who remain in their services. Those higher rates translate to higher incomes, leading to possible increases in welfare (Imhof and Lee, 19).

Producer organizations, considered by some to be the most significant aspect of FT policy in affecting economic development, are a key component of the FT network (Fridell, 2006). Producer organizations operate in a cooperative fashion and are always democratic in orientation (Ronchi, 24). Although significant degrees of heterogeneity exist in each organization’s goals and methods, they all seek to empower the producer to improve his/her quality of life (Bezencon and Bili, 95) (Ronchi, 24). These organizations perform an array of critical tasks which generate tangible benefits for each individual producer. These include pooling economic risks and reducing production costs through cooperative operations and purchases (Calo and Wise, 12) (Raynolds, 21) (Imhof and Lee, 19). Another key service producer organizations offer is education, particularly in practical application, as in the training of organic growing techniques, financial and management issues and strategies, and crop improvement skills. Learned skills allow for more efficient yields and lower production and intermediary costs, again translating to better economic gains for the producer (Imhof and Lee, 19) (Raynolds, 19). These organizations also promote the empowerment of producers, which is achieved by providing credit lines and agricultural extension services, while enabling higher returns for their crops and increased income generation (UC, 591,596) (Ronchi, 24). Interestingly, in Nicaragua, producer organizations specifically seek to
promote gender equity as well, and will issue lines of credit to women producers (UC, 591, 596). There is uncertainty however, on the impact of these organizations - effects are at times much less measurable or harder to discern from other externalities, making some hesitant to attribute increases in welfare directly to their activities (Raynolds, 17-18). Even where data shows increases in livelihoods following the introduction of FT producer organizations in an area, local workers and farmers can often be unaware of FT, much less of its role as a potential social driver. This suggests communication problems on behalf of producer organizations which makes it harder yet to directly link welfare gains to their activities (UC, 594).

**Major Criticisms**

Existing economic models point to problematic issues related to maintaining artificially-high commodity prices through the use of premiums, particularly in targeted industries within a sector, and the dependency generated by niche markets, which could undermine the positive economic gains and sustained development resultant from FT policies. One significant issue throughout the agricultural sector, but particularly in the coffee industry, is that of oversupply (Imhof and Lee, 2, 4-5). Oversupply can be exacerbated by incentivizing one industry over another within a sector, or more specifically, by discriminately offering higher prices for one crop as opposed to others. Increasing the income and gains for producers in that particular, favored industry creates a natural impetus for more firms to enter that sector. This not only drives increasing supply, which can damage economic development through forcing down prices (in turn lowering gains and return rates
for existing producers), but has the potential to draw production resources away from other sectors, at the “opportunity cost” of overall market efficiency (Yanchus and Vanssay, 237). Models show that higher, “fair” prices distort export growth in affected sectors, distorting the measurement of terms of trade and welfare gains, as well (Yanchus and Vanssay, 237-9). Furthermore, by incentivizing distorted growth in a economic sector of an LDC that is catered towards a niche market, the potential for a “dangerous dependency” exists, owed to the possibility of market busts which could lead to devastating effects on the welfare of producers (Yanchus and Vanssay, 237-9) (UC, 596). However, recognizing the potential for lop-sided growth and capital concentration, FT organizations do encourage diversification of investment from income gains (as opposed to simply expanding production) and they often provide the education opportunities to help producers realize that goal (UC, 596) (Imhof and Lee, 5).

Another economic argument against FT policies is that price floors are an ineffective or suboptimal tool for redistributing income, even that income which is resultant from the gains from trade (Yanchus and Vanssay, 238-9). Economic models demonstrate that direct transfers of income, potentially in the form of direct aid, are more effective and less harmful. Additionally, a direct transfer would assumedly circumvent the issue of sector concentration, providing for a more efficient allocation of resources (Yanchus and Vanssay, 238-9). However, this argument does not fully take into account producer organizations’ efforts, the enabling gains of increased trade (which promotes growth in a sector, but also outside of a sector through the gradual diffusion of capital), nor the social determinants that affect
consumer demand in AICs. FT allows for open market trading (in line with global trading structures and AIC economic mindsets), while still generating development gains (Calo and Wise, 12) (Fridell, 13-17).

An additional problem outlined with FT policy is related to the commodity market itself. While FT markets are growing, often at rapid rates, the FT market share still remains small, accounting for an insignificant portion of total global agricultural trade (Calo and Wise, 12) (“Facts and figures”) (UC, 596). This means that producers will sometimes have to place their crop on non-FT markets, sometimes diminishing income security and contributing to the volatility of the agricultural commodity market (UC, 596) (Imhof and Lee, 20).

It is also important to consider that other factors have the potential to undermine the long-term effectiveness and sustainability of FT implementation. One issue is the increasingly stringent environmental regulations that are being implemented, over time, in FT certification processes (“Benefits of Fair Trade”). While these regulations are in accordance with FT’s stated mission of sustainable development, they present the possibility that farmers will not have the resources or capability to continue to comply (UC, 596). This could have the effect of ostracizing producers and destabilizing supply.

There is also the problem of the debt held by cooperatives and producer organizations, which is often a necessary condition of initiating production. Debt is considered the “main reason why small producers receive a lower price at the farm gate,” and is what makes it harder for farmers to cover the costs of production and living (UC, 589-90). In combination with fees paid by producers to FT organizations, the amount gained from
crop sales is sometimes significantly lower than the “fair price” (UC, 590). However, FT organizations do provide lines of credit to indebted farmers (where banks often can or will not) to assist them in balance of payments issues and are known to ethically and cooperatively handle owned debt, in an attempt to counteract the detriments of debt problems and encourage typically disadvantaged producers (Raynolds, 18-21) (UC, 589,596).

In addition, they use paid dues to reinvest into community and infrastructure development, including agricultural extension services, which generates a positive, albeit ambiguous, gain in welfare and production capacities (Raynolds, 20-22).

Another problem is the lack of domestic government support for farmers, in the form of subsidies or protectionist policies. This was exacerbated by the Debt Crisis in Latin America throughout the 1980’s which resulted in IMF loans that often had strict austerity conditions, including the cessation of agricultural subsidies.

Conclusion

Fair Trade has seen phenomenal growth since the first certification began in 1988 in the Netherlands, not only in economic output, but within international dialogue (among both NGOs and IOs), academic research, and corporate product lines (Bezencon and Bili, 95,110). FLO reports that over the last five years, there has been an average of 40% overall trade growth per year, amounting to €2.9 billion in certified sales in 2008 alone (“Facts and figures”). This market growth is fueling the increase of Fair Trade product producers the world over, and thousands throughout Latin America are experiencing some degree of welfare gain in their individual lives and communities as a result.
The long-term sustainability of Fair Trade is most apparent in the range of motivations for AIC-consumer purchasing. The ethical-focus of Fair Trade satisfies a growing notion of social responsibility for Northern consumers. This is not missed by corporations, like McDonalds and Nestlé, who have incorporated Fair Trade products as a way to demonstrate their willingness to uphold these evolving views and legitimize their output (Bezencon and Blili, 95-96, 110-111).

Moreover, Fair Trade appears to align with various elements of socially-conscious thought over time. From the call of early socialist thinkers for more equitable redistributions of wealth, better working conditions and wages for workers (derived from the true value of labor and product), and cooperative and democratic control of the modes of production; to G-77 demands for adjusted international trade systems that promoted LDC economic growth and development, stabilized raw commodity prices, and instituted trade systems that reflected their comparative advantages (which lie heavily in agricultural production) (G-77, 1964); to the more modern concept of Sustainable Development, which calls for addressing of environmental concerns and promoting responsible development that demonstrates a concern for the Earth and human posterity – Fair Trade provides at least a partial answer.

Accumulatively, through meeting the demands of the North and encouraging development in the South, FT is proving to be a mutually acceptable mechanism for global trade. Although there is economic evidence that illustrates the potential risks of FT and assumes only ambiguous benefits at best, there is strong evidence that showcases the tangible economic growth FT offers to individual producers in the agricultural sector of
various Latin American countries. Undoubtedly, there are issues that remain to be tackled, including debt, government support, diversification of producer investment, and excess supply issues, but it is undeniable that FT has increased the income and has made some impact in the welfare of producers, and that it has the potential to continue to do so.

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Haiti and the UN; Room for Improvement

Ian Proctor

The island nation of Haiti, labeled by Minxin Pei and his co-contributors to the work of Francis Fukuyama’s *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, is “a case of complete failure.” As Jason Brownlee cites them, “the problem, they contend, lay in the aftermath of the invasion and precipitous cutbacks in troops levels. The main culprits were ‘inadequate military commitment’ and a mismanaged reconstruction effort.”¹ Haiti has a long history of political tumult and foreign involvement. However, it is largely a homogenous society with a united culture. The problem, as Brownlee recognizes is that Haiti does not have the political culture and bureaucratic legacy on which to build a functioning state as was found in Germany and Japan in the post-World War II environment. Instead of United States-led direct involvement, which has clearly not led to success in establishing democratic legacy, an expansion of the United Nations Stabilization Mission to Haiti should be pursued. The reasons for this angle of operation to be examined in greater detail later include the fact that the Mission is regionally led, has yet to staffed by military and civilian personnel to the level necessary to legitimately function, and has yet to fully accomplish any of the goals set about in its mandate.

Haiti has a long history of being the international ground for competition over global resources. Spain and France competed over the island since its discovery by Christopher Columbus’s mission in 1492. Decimating the native Taino Arawak Indian population in the process, the two European powers sought to exploit the supposed vast cache of gold stashed somewhere on the island. France officially received control over much of what is modern

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day Haiti in the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, and set up a lucrative plantation system based on the heavy use of slave labor. On January 1, 1804, Jean-Jacques Dessalines led the former slave population in formerly establishing the independence of the now named Haiti. To this date, Haiti remains the only successful slave rebellion state.

Despite the optimism to this point for the Haitian people, following the independence movement Haiti has experienced nothing but trouble. Dessalines was made emperor for life, was then assassinated in 1806, and the country split into two autonomous bodies for more than fifteen years. Haiti then had to agree to pay the French government reparations for its independence after negotiating defeat in a battle in 1825. An extensive series of coups ensued, lasting a hundred years until the United States invaded and occupied the state from 1915 to 1934, allowing the Haitian government to reorganize itself. From 1957 to 1986, the Duvalier family turned Haiti into its own vassal state, aided at times by the US in support of its own economy. This spurred a massive migration of a solid portion of the population seeking to escape the oppressive rule. When public unrest sought to oust “Baby Doc” Duvalier and his family from power, the US arranged for the family’s transport to and exile in France. In 1987, a constitution was drafted and adopted by great popular support of the Haitian population. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former priest, was elected president by a solid majority, but served only a year before being ousted by the military. Aristide gained international support in his three year hiatus, and was able to return to the country in 1994 to finish his term. He was then re-elected in 2000, but again was foiled by a coup in 2004, this time supposedly orchestrated by US and French troops. Rene Preval is the current president after serving a previous term from 1995 to 2000.
Haiti has experienced numerous separate United Nations missions, the first three functioning mainly to train and provide legitimacy to the police force after Aristide disbanded the military upon his return to power in 1994. The Haitian National Police (HNP) force’s sole purpose is to provide security for the population. It has largely failed due to its limited size, being undersupplied, and insufficiently trained. The first of these missions, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was in place from September 1993 until June of 1996, and was to serve the purpose of training a new police force, providing a safe environment that would allow for elections to occur, and provide security for the administration and its officials. The second mission was the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) and lasted from July 1996 until June 1997 and sought to further the work done by UNMIH. The third mission to the island was the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) and took place between August and November of 1997. “Tasks of UNTMIH’s police element included training HNP specialized units in crowd control, the rapid reaction force and Palace security, areas considered to be of distinct importance.”

Another mission was the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) was a realization of the discussions between President Preval of Haiti and then Secretary-General Kofi Annan. They recognized that the civilian police force needed extensive training, supervision, and support in order to perform its duties in the fullest capacity. This mission lasted from December 1997 to March of 2000. Concurrently, the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) was established in 1993 in a joint effort by the United Nations.

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Security Council (UNSC) and the Organization of American States (OAS) to monitor the human rights issues in Haiti as well as provide a forum for international cooperation in dealing with aid to Haiti. In late March of 2000, all of these previous mandates, UNMIH, UNSMIH, UNTMIH, MICIVIH, and MIPONUH, were consolidated into the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH). This serves to coordinate international aid and political and social concerns, ensure the effectiveness of the judiciary, provide a sense of security concerning elections, and continue monitoring the training of the HNP.

After the military coup in 2004 and the forcible exile of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a subsequent mission was established to move Haiti back toward stability. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)’s “mandate is to restore a secure and stable environment, to promote the political process, to strengthen Haiti’s Government institutions and rule-of-law structures, as well as to promote and to protect human rights.”³ It accomplishes this through a regional cooperative of states headed by Brazil. This is very effective because the personnel from the bottom all the way to highest staffing positions (the Special Representative’s Executive Deputy is Brazilian) are familiar with the socio-political atmosphere of the area. Special consideration must be given here because Haiti traces its roots through the Francophone dialect, as opposed to much of the rest of the Latin American States. The Special Representative appoint for the ongoing mission, Hedi Annabi, is Tunisian, another former French colony. This represents a great understanding of the area as it incorporates both the Latin/Caribbean American and French background of Haiti.

³ Ibid
Haiti continues to be one of the world’s poorest nations. It is the only state in North and South America to be defined by the United Nations in the Least Developed Countries. According to the Human Development Index Report in 2009, Haiti is currently ranked 149th out of 182 countries studied. Further, its GDP per capita fell just under US$1,200 for 2008, while the majority of the population is forced to live using just two dollars each day. Though Haiti was among the first nations in the Western Hemisphere to throw off its bonds of colonialism, it lags far behind its neighbors in the region because of lack of stability built through years of oscillating between authoritarian rule and foreign intervention. As Paul Farmer puts it, “Haitians are still living with the legacy of the slave trade and of the revolt that finally removed the French.”

As is mentioned by Brownlee in his review of a number of different authors, security is most often the major concern for nations undergoing the UN peacekeeping/US nation-building process. This is a failed case because unlike other UN mission countries, Haiti required four separate missions, still experienced a coup following an election where barely ten percent of the population turned out in confidence to vote, and most important, the state cannot exercise its defining role as having the monopoly over the violence. Haiti lags not only because it has yet to develop sustainable market infrastructure (it still relies heavily on foreign aid as revenue for its government) that would allow the country to become free-floating, but its HNP continues to be understaffed and ill-equipped to handle the internal pressures of maintaining control. The missions themselves were vastly understaffed respectively having 6065, 1297, 300, 522, and 9073 personnel deployed between UNMIH, UNSMIH, UNTMIH, MIPONUH and MINUSTAH. While MINUSTAH is still ongoing and the

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trend has been growing for number of personnel deployed, what is evident is that tighter controls over the handling of policing situations are required. The deployed forces must continue to work with the civilian population and assimilate knowledge about the area so as to effectively train the police to handle any possible situation that may arise. To this point, organizational learning as cited by Lise Howard has failed. “There has simply not been much sustained learning in the effort to help Haiti, either on the first level, or on the second. The lack of learning in the Secretariat, the difficult domestic situation in Haiti, and the unhelpful influence of some Security Council members have all spelled failure for the missions thus far.”

Possible solutions for the Haitian case include a bolstering of the mission through the increasing of financial aid and military personnel. This however, is easier said than done, as the global market has undergone recession and the availability of international aid has decreased. A two stage solution for ending poverty within the country is also necessary. This requires the drawdown of dependency on foreign aid in the long run by creating sustainable markets in the short run. Direct investment projects and civilian work corps that would provide salaries are two viable options in this scenario. Haiti also relies heavily on its agricultural sector for the majority of its GDP; it has been proven that countries moving toward develop status usually emphasize their manufacturing industries. Suffice it to say that while food aid is extremely important for the short term relief of basic human needs, sufficient funds need to be allocated toward the spurring of the economy in the direction of sustainable development.

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Further, through an increased police presence by the Haitians themselves, the government will be able to add to its legitimacy. When a population can see its government exercise enough control over society so that civilians no longer have to worry about their personal security, the people will likely lend confidence to bureaucratic institutions. This is vital to the continuation of the shaky peace that is present in Haiti. Haiti in the long run must not rely on foreign security forces to provide legitimacy for its government to function. On the same token, foreign parties, specifically the United States, must refrain from involving themselves too heavily individually. The regional cooperative established by MINUSTAH must be maintained so as to decrease the impact of one state trying to impose its will and protect its own interests.

Ian Proctor is native of Richmond, Virginia and a senior at University of Florida majoring in Political Science and History, with a minor in Business Administration and a certificate in International Relations. He was a member of the Student Honors Organization’s Executive Board his freshman year. Ian has been involved with UF’s Model United Nations club for 3 years, and has served as the Director for Conference Services, a head delegate for UF’s Model United Nations competitions, and is currently the Vice President of UF MUN and the Director of Committee on British Intelligence for GatorMUN VIII. He is working on his senior thesis researching the historical development of UN Peacekeeping Missions. This summer, he worked at the State Department’s United States Mission office at the United Nations in New York City.

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